

SECRET

EXCISE

1183
FOR RM USE ONLY

AIRGRAM

A-39
NO.

SECRET

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	5
ARA	EUR	FE
	5	6
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	
		3
L	FBO	AND
S/P	MC	RS/AN
1	1	12
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
31		3
NSC		
6		

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : ADEN, AMMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, BONN FOR CINCSAF, CAIRO, DAMASCUS, DHAHRAN, FRANKFURT FOR LINDSEY AIR STATION, ATTN: DSC INTELLIGENCE, IDCA, HEADQUARTERS USAREUR HEIDELBERG, KARACHI, KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, LONDON, MOGADISCIO, RABAT, TAI, TEHRAN, TEL AVIV, TRIPOLI, TUNIS, POLAD CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR DIA, CHUSMTM

FROM : Amembassy JIDDA

DATE: August 11, 1966

SUBJECT: Monthly Review for Saudi Arabia - July, 1966

REF :

Table of Contents

SUMMARY

I. FOREIGN RELATIONS

- A. The Arab Cold War
Nasser Again Attacks Saudi Arabia

II. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

- A. Royal Family
King Returns from US/Royal Princes

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

SECRET

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

BWrampelmeier:mdl 8/9/66

Contents and Classification Approved by:

DCM:TWS:elve

Clearances:

in draft: POL:RWStokey

ECON:CMSonne

DAO:Lt.Col.JHBarrett

USIS:GRThompson

REVIEWED BY: *[Signature]* DATE: 10/15/82

RDS or XDS EXT. DATE: 11 11 62

TS AUTH. REASON(S):

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS: ☒

DECLASSIFIED ☐ RELEASABLE ☐

RELEASE DENIED ☒ IN ☐

PAPER FOI EXEMPTIONS: ☒ (b)(1) ☒ (b)(7) ☒ (b)(7)(D)

SECRET

SECRET

2

C. Internal Security

13

Labor Situation Quiet

D. Defense

14

Military Situation in the South/Air Defense/

F-86 Squadron/C-130 Aircraft/Mobility

Modernization/National Guard

TEL. US SAUDI RELATIONS

A. Results of King's Visit

17

King Pleased/Saudi Press Reaction/Benefits

For US

B. Yemen

18

C. Vietnam

18

SUMMARYSECRET

SECRET

3

SECRET

SECRET

4

2 RELEVANT [] Deportations of illegal immigrants and even of some long-resident Palestinian and Egyptian employees of Aramco and other business firms continued to be reported although the numbers of persons involved was not disclosed. The labor situation in the Eastern Province remained quiet following the demonstrations by Aramco workers in Dhahran and Ras Tanura in mid-June. Seven of the 16 workers arrested were released.

RELEVANT [] The Saudis also expressed interest in purchasing additional F-86 aircraft in order to form a tactical air squadron. Negotiations concerning the sale of additional C-130 aircraft and a modern vehicle fleet to the Saudi Armed Forces continued during the month.

The King returned from his US visit highly pleased with his reception in Washington. The King spoke in warm terms of his US welcome both in his public speech July 3 and in private conversations. Press commentary on the visit described the King's accomplishments in the United States as publicizing the Arab view on Palestine, giving a better image of Saudi Arabia's progress and development, and promoting various Arab and Muslim causes, as well as the cause of world peace and understanding. From the US standpoint, the visit was a considerable success in helping to cement US-Saudi relations. One by-product of the King's visit may hopefully be greater Saudi willingness to consider a positive contribution to the support of South Vietnam.

* * * * *

II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

A. The Arab Cold War

Nasser Again Attacks Saudi Arabia The inter-Arab cold war continued throughout July as the UAR and Syria kept up their attacks on Arab "reactionaries." In addition to the well-worn fulminations against the alleged "Islamic Pact", Egyptian and Syrian propaganda media reacted negatively to King Faisal's June visit to the US which they viewed as part of an "imperialist-reactionary" plot against "liberated" Arab states. In a well-

SECRET

SECRET

publicized interview with the Manchester Guardian and in his Revolution Day and Alexandria speeches of July 22 and 26 respectively, UAR President Nasser again attacked Saudi Arabia for being in league with imperialism. Inter alia, Nasser alleged that US and UK military bases existed on Saudi soil and that the British were providing Saudi Arabia combat pilots for the new Saudi Lightning interceptors.

The Saudis reacted with considerable sensitivity to this charge. Following a denial by Her Majesty's Government that there were any British bases or British mercenaries in Saudi Arabia, high-ranking Saudi officials urged that the US Government issue a similar denial. (The Department has thus far been reluctant to do so on the grounds that newsmen have shown no interest in this charge and a statement now would merely provoke further UAR attacks.)

SECRET

SECRET

6

SECRET

SECRET

7

SECRET

SECRET

8

SECRET

Jidda A-39

SECRET

9

SECRET

SECRET

10

SECRET

SECRET

11

SECRET

SECRET

12

II. INTERNAL AFFAIRSA. Royal Family

King Returns from US. King Faisal and the members of his party returned from their visit to Spain and the US July 2. The King was given an enthusiastic reception at the Jidda Airport and was honored the next evening by a public rally and banquet held by "the people of Jidda" at the Jidda Palace Hotel. Estimates of those present at the latter function vary between 10,000 and 15,000. The program at the rally, which was arranged by a committee of prominent businessmen, included a number of speeches and poems, including one by a representative of the "Palestinian community", welcoming the King and praising his successful missions to the US and elsewhere on behalf of Arab and Islamic causes. Most speakers referred to the furor during his US visit over the King's remarks about the "Jews are our enemies" and commended this outspoken indication of Saudi support for the Arab Palestine cause.

In a carefully measured reply, which contrasted dramatically with the bombast that had preceded it, the King spoke warmly of the welcome he had received in the United States and dismissed the boycott of his visit by New York City and State authorities as an unimportant incident unrepresentative of the feelings of the majority of the American people. He deftly avoided dilating on the topic of Palestine, stating only that "if the Arabs are serious ... about rescuing Palestine, you, my brothers, will be in the van, not the rear." In an unusual gesture of humility for a Saudi monarch, Faisal modestly described himself as no more than the representative of the Saudi people on this visit and even declared that "I am no better than you; if anything, you are better than I." Interestingly enough, a few Saudis were critical of the King's latter remark, expressing the opinion that it was improper for a monarch to demean himself publicly in such a manner. Others, however, welcomed this touch of "democracy" which some observers have suggested may be a reaction to political currents in other Arab countries where leaders, elected or otherwise, have increasingly sought to identify themselves with their peoples.

SECRET

Jidda A-39

SECRET

13

SECRET

SECRET

14

Labor Situation Quiet. The labor situation in the Eastern Province remained quiet during the month following the occurrence of protest demonstrations in Dheirani and Ras Tanura in mid-June. Consulate General Dhahran reported that seven of the 16 Aramco workers arrested at that time were released during July, although investigation of their cases is continuing. It was thought likely that many of the other suspects would eventually be released as well, leaving the Saudi authorities and the Company as mystified as ever concerning the identity of the clandestine organization within Aramco suspected of having organized this and other worker protest demonstrations and boycotts over the past few years.

D. Defense

RELEVANT

Requests by USMFM advisors to visit troop units in the Southern Command area, G-3, Ministry of Defense and Aviation, in mid-July asked USMFM Army Section advisors to accompany MOFA officers on visits to Tabuk and the south in order to observe and give advice on tactical field exercises which

SECRET

SECRET

15

MODA apparently plans to hold in the near future. MODA G-4 personnel have also sought logistical advice from USMTM advisors in connection with the build-up in the south.

On July 19 Brig. Gen. LEAHY, Chief, USMTM, and his staff briefed MODA Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. MUTLAQ on USMTM's proposals for reorganization of the RSAF in line with formation of the proposed integrated Army-Air Force Air Defense Command. Although USMTM's proposals were accepted by RSAF Director Col. ZULAIR, Gen. Mutlaq was non-committal and has agreed to study the matter. In order to assist MODA in formation of its Air Defense Command, Gen. Mutlaq and six Saudi Army and RSAF officers have been invited to make an orientation visit to US air defense installations in the Continental US this fall.

F-86 Squadron. With the prospective incorporation of the British-made Lightnings into the Air Defense Command, MODA has shown a renewed interest in obtaining additional F-86 aircraft in order to create a tactical air

SECRET

SECRET

16

squadron. In a July 3 letter to Gen. Leahy, Gen. Mutlaq indicated the RSAF is interested in purchasing eight additional F-86s to add to the 12 F-86 aircraft being transferred to Saudi ownership following their return from IRAN. Mutlaq noted that the Saudis wish to sell or exchange the 14 T-series aircraft now in their inventory which were obtained from the US under grant aid. Acquisition of additional F-86s could give the RSAF a greater tactical capability, simplify their supply and maintenance problems, and serve to maintain a US presence within the RSAF despite the Saudi acquisition of British aircraft. There are several problems involved, however, most important of which is the ability of the RSAF to provide enough pilots to man both the F-86s and the new interceptor squadrons. To meet this problem, USMTM has been giving priority attention to development of an effective, realistic F-86 flying program at Dhahran following the return of the F-86s from IRAN.

C-130 Aircraft. In a meeting with MODA Prince Sultan July 28 our Ambassador discussed Sultan's desire to purchase one or more C-130 aircraft, using as the down payment for this the \$800,000 which the US Government has conditionally agreed to pay Saudi Arabia for the five C-123 aircraft in Saudi possession. Sultan asserted that he had been "promised" by the Department of Defense delivery of one C-130 within four or five months time and insisted that the "friendly USC" help arrange for its delivery earlier than the June, 1967 delivery date specified by Lockheed. Sultan indicated that one reason for the urgency of earlier delivery was his desire to be able to use the C-130s to supplement Saudi Airlines capabilities in handling pilgrim traffic during the March, 1967 Hajj. The Ambassador noted that our commitments in Vietnam and to other allies made delivery of any C-130s earlier than next June extremely unlikely but agreed to convey Sultan's request to Washington.

Mobility Modernization. In the same meeting Sultan told the Ambassador that, with the King's support, he had finally managed to convince his colleagues in the Council of Ministers of the necessity for the mobility modernization program. However, in view of the Ministers' concerns over the overall cost of this and other defense programs, Sultan requested that the USC agree to (1) a more equitable payment schedule stretched over a ten year period with a lower initial deposit and installments in the early years and (2) a reduction of interest charges from 5½% to between 4%-5%. Sultan expressed a desire to conclude the final agreement on this program as soon as possible and readily agreed to the Ambassador's suggestion that a DOD financial expert visit Saudi Arabia to work out the final details.

National Guard. Embassy and DAO officers conferred with National Guard officials in Riyadh July 17-18 and reviewed US Department of the Army proposals for training of 20 National Guard NCOs in the U.S. National Guard advisor Brig. Gen. HUSSEINI expressed full agreement with the proposals and asked for a letter of offer to be submitted as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the SS Steel Seafarer unloaded a shipment of US arms for the National

SECRET

SECRET

17

Guard at Dammam in early July. National Guard officers, however, have been unable to identify and store the items received and have requested the services of a U.S. military supply specialist to assist them in setting up a proper stock room and assembling the items as received.

III. US-SAUDI RELATIONS

A. Results of King's Visit

King Pleased. From all reports, King Faisal returned from the United States immensely pleased with his reception in Washington and with his talks with the President, Secretary RUSK, and other American officials. In addition to the complimentary remarks about his reception during his July 3 speech, the King is reported to have spoken in glowing terms of the visit to his friends and to those attending his majlis. The warm feeling generated by the visit was also reflected in the unprecedented attendance at the Embassy's Independence Day reception of Crown Prince Khalid and four other senior royal princes. In a conversation with our Ambassador July 6 the King affirmed that the visit was a complete success. His prime purpose in going to Washington had been to get acquainted with the President and the King had come away with a highly favorable impression.

Saudi Press Reaction. As seen by the Saudi press, the King's visit accomplished the following results:

- (1) By his frank remarks at his June 22 press luncheon about "Jews are our enemies" and the resulting furor in New York City, the King had for the first time made the great majority of the American people aware of the Arab side of the Palestine problem;
- (2) By his dignity and personality, as well as by his public statements describing Saudi Arabia's progress and development, the King once and for all swept away the old stereotypes about Saudis being uncivilized desert nomads riding about on camels;
- (3) The King's visit served to make the American public and the entire world aware of the important contributions which the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular have made to world civilization;
- (4) The King's talks with American leaders have advanced the cause of world peace and international understanding; and
- (5) Faisal successfully exposed the lies and deceptions of those other Arab leaders (e.g., Nasser and the Syrian Ba'ath) who attacked his visit to Washington and sought to deprecate what the King had accomplished on behalf of Arab and Muslim causes.

Although the boycott of the King's visit by New York political figures was a major topic in most Saudi editorial comment on the King's visit, the

SECRET

SECRET

18

King's own satisfaction with the results of his visit and the evidence that many Americans disagreed with Governor ROCKEFELLER's and Mayor LINDSAY's decision to boycott the King helped to keep the incident in perspective and prevent the matter from becoming an anti-American issue in the Saudi press.

Benefits for US. From the US point of view, the visit was a considerable success in helping to cement US-Saudi relations.

BI (A)(5) We have more to follow up the discussions with the King in Washington concerning what can best be done by the US and Saudi Arabia, jointly and collectively, to meet the threat of Communist penetration into the Middle East. The King told our Ambassador on July 6 that he would like the Ambassador to continue these discussions with Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf and also with Minister of Interior Prince Fahd who had been out of the Kingdom at the time of the earlier exchange on this subject several months ago.

B. Yemen

In his conversation with the King July 6 and in subsequent meetings with Dr. Phareson, Saqqaf, and other senior Saudi officials our Ambassador urged the Saudis to make every effort to keep the Kuwaiti mediation effort alive. While avoiding becoming a party to these negotiations, we nevertheless did what we could to encourage the Saudis to react constructively to Nasser's June proposals and to avoid an inflexible posture that could lead the Egyptians to break off the negotiations.

C. Vietnam

One by-product of the King's US visit may hopefully be greater Saudi Government willingness to make a positive contribution to the support of South Vietnam. The King and his senior advisors have all along been sympathetic toward the US effort in Vietnam although they have been hesitant to take any action that would seem to conflict with their public policy of non-alignment. The King was impressed, however, with the President's explanation of the sacrifices for freedom which the US has made in Vietnam and elsewhere since World War II. Shortly after his return to Jidda the King taxed the British Ambassador for his government's public criticisms of the US bombing of fuel depots in the Hanoi area, reminding the Ambassador that the US effort in Vietnam was on behalf of the entire Free World. We have also noticed in recent months a greater willingness by the Saudi press to publish USIS material on Vietnam as well as the relative absence of items critical of the US role there. Nevertheless, Saudi public interest in Vietnam continues to be spathetic with some Saudi journalists dubious that the US following its present policies will be able either to

SECRET

SECRET

19

win a conclusive military victory or force the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table.

Acting on Departmental instructions, the Ambassador on July 28 raised the subject of Vietnam with Dr. Pharaon and urged that Saudi Arabia consider making a contribution, if only a token one of petroleum products, to the South Vietnamese. Although Pharaon's initial reaction was negative, he eventually agreed to discuss this with the King.

ELTS

*Law*SECRET